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Membership categorization, culture 
and norms in action 
W I L L I A M  H O U S L E Y
C A R D I F F  U N I V E R S I T Y ,  U K
R I C H A R D  F I T Z G E R A L D  
U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  Q U E E N S L A N D ,  A U S T R A L I A  
A B S T R A C T  In this article, we examine the extent to which membership 
categorization analysis (MCA) can inform an understanding of  reasoning 
within the public domain where morality, policy and cultural politics are 
visible (Smith and Tatalovich, 2003). Through the examination of  three 
examples, we demonstrate how specific types of  category device(s) are a 
ubiquitous feature of  accountable practice in the public domain where 
morality matters and public policy intersect. Furthermore, we argue that 
MCA provides a method for analysing the mundane mechanics associated 
with everyday cultural politics and democratic accountability assembled 
and presented within news media and broadcast settings.
K E Y  W O R D S :  categorization sequence, membership categorization analysis, 
mundane morality, norms-in-action, politics
What is it that constitutes the moral space of  everyday life? In many respects, 
this question has a connection with the classic issue of  the very possibility of  
social order and organization. In one sense, the issue can be understood to centre 
around the normative features of  action where ‘social’ norms can be understood 
to be the product of  prior socialization, ideological transmission or discursive 
imprinting. Talcott Parsons (1964: 30) states:
Not only is action normatively oriented in the sense of  pursuing ends, it is also subject 
to certain normative conditions, to rules which guide it. For instance, in pursuing the 
end of  closing a profitable deal, a businessman may consider himself  subject to the 
condition that it shall be done ‘honestly’. From some points of  view, such rules may 
consider themselves as ends of  the course of  action under analysis. They appear rather 
as considerations limiting the acceptable range of  alternative means . . . 
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This notion of  normative regulation of  social action and behaviour also finds 
resonance within Foucauldian thinking. Foucault, with reference to 18th-century 
ideas, notes that the study of  the ‘healthy man’ became the model for early mod-
ern medicine. This discursive positioning of  medicine and the ‘healthy man’, 
Foucault (1989: 40) argues, assumes:
. . . a normative posture, which authorises it not only to distribute advice as to a 
healthy life, but also to dictate the standards for physical and moral relations of  the 
individual and of  the society in which he lives.
However, whilst the notion of  norms is a central feature of  modern sociological 
theorizing, the everyday practice or invocation of  norms as an everyday part of  
social life, or ‘norms-in-action’, are less so. In this article, we want to explore issues 
surrounding normativity in everyday life and, more specifically, norms-in-action 
(Housley and Fitzgerald, 2002), before linking the analysis of  norms-in-action 
with current issues and debates concerning the analysis of  ‘cultural politics’. 
In doing so, we take our lead from Sacks (1974: 224) in relation to his work on 
social interaction. Sacks states:
I shall focus next on the fact that an activity can be category bound and then on 
the import of  there being a norm that provides for some second activity, given the 
occurrence of  the first, considering both of  these with regard to the ‘correctness’, for 
members, of  ‘possible descriptions’.
Deriving from Sacks’ early work, ‘Membership Categorization Analysis’ (MCA) is 
now a well-established ethnomethodological approach that examines the prac-
tical methods of  categorization work in relation to the local accomplishment of  
social and moral organization and order (Garfinkel, 2002). It involves examining 
the practices that display ‘culture-in-action’ in relation to the accomplishment, 
negotiation and repair of  social and moral organization. The development of  the 
methodology of  MCA in recent years has also drawn attention to the relation-
ship between sequential and categorical methods within talk-in-interaction 
(Baker, 1984; Eglin and Hester, 1992; Fitzgerald and Housley, 2002; Hester 
and Eglin, 1997; Hester and Francis, 1994; Housley, 2000, 2003; Housley and 
Fitzgerald, 2002; Watson, 1978, 1997). Whilst this methodology has developed a 
fine-grained analytic sensitivity to the locally organized display of  categories and 
devices as situated events, this methodology has also explored members’ moral 
work and normative assessments as a practical and occasioned matter (Jayyusi, 
1991). Deployed within a range of  settings, this includes moral-political work 
and the reflexive rendering of  accountability as an accomplished social fact. 
The methods and configurations through which such normative regulation is 
interactionally accomplished include specific forms of  category configuration 
that are recognizable resources for members in their attempts to constitute 
opinion, make evaluations, promote specific world views, assess practices and 
thereby constitute local configurations of  moral organization and sense. It is to 
an analytic and empirical consideration of  these practical configurations that 
we now turn.
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Membership categorization analysis and norms-in-action
Jayyusi’s (1984, 1991) classic investigation into the moral organization of  
categorization draws from Sacks’ work on membership categorization and sub-
sequent studies (Coulter, 1979, 1983; Drew, 1978; Pomerantz, 1978; Sharrock, 
1974; Watson, 1983) that identified and explicated the moral inferential logic 
( Jayyusi, 1991: 240) of  everyday social practice. Jayyusi (1991: 240) states:
Sacks’ notion of  category bound actions, rights and obligations not only points 
out the moral features of  our category concepts, but also provides thus for the very 
moral accountability of  certain actions or omissions. His elucidation of  the notion of  
certain categories as standardised relational pairs . . . not only uncovers features of  
the organisation of  members’ conventional knowledge of  the social world, but clearly 
demonstrates via empirical analysis, how that knowledge is both morally constituted 
and constitutive of  moral praxis – it provides for a variety of  ascriptions, discoveries, 
imputations, conclusions, judgements etc. on the part of  mundane reasoners.
Jayyusi goes on to note how ethnomethodological analysis has illustrated how 
practical activities (e.g. asking questions, providing descriptions and making 
‘sense’) are also inexorably moral. Jayyusi (1991: 241) continues by stating:
I have elsewhere, building on Sacks’ work, tried to show in some detail how moral 
reasoning is practically organised, and how, at the same time, and perhaps more 
significantly, practical reasoning is morally organised . . . Very clearly, the use of  
even mundanely descriptive categories, such as ‘mother’, ‘doctor’, ‘policeman’, for 
example, makes available a variety of  possible inferential trajectories in situ, that 
are grounded in the various ‘features’ bound up with, or constitutive of, these 
categories as organisations of  practical mundane social knowledge. These features 
might be ‘moral’ features in the first place (such as the kinds of  ‘rights’ and ‘obliga-
tions’ that are bound up with one’s being a ‘mother’, or a ‘doctor’ or ‘policeman’), 
or they might be otherwise – such as the ‘knowledge’ that is, for example, taken 
to be bound up with a category such as ‘doctor’, or the kind of  ‘work’ that is taken to 
be constitutive of, or tied to, a category such as a policeman. But even in the latter 
case, it turns out that as evidenced in our actual practices, for example, ‘knowledge’ 
has its responsibilities – even these features provide grounds for the attribution 
of  all kinds of  moral properties, for finding that certain kinds of  events or actions 
may or may not have taken place, for determining culpability, even for defeating the 
applicability of  the category or description in the first place.
Thus, Jayyusi points to and identifies the mutually constitutive and reflexive 
relationship between practical action and normativity. Furthermore, the pro-
cess of  categorization in both its personal and non-personal forms within 
talk-in-interaction are realized within various forms of  preference organization 
within adjacency pair formats identified by more sequential analyses of  talk-
in-interaction (Pomerantz, 1978). These sequential features of  members’ talk 
can be understood in terms of  the practical-moral inferential work of  members. 
Furthermore, in terms of  the developments in MCA and EM, reported and explored 
recently in this journal, a concern for categorization and sequential work in 
talk-in-interaction is prominent. Indeed, the issue of  adjacency pairs, preference 
organization and so forth provides an excellent site with which to observe the 
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intertwining character of  normativity, category and sequence in members’ talk, 
for example, where the fulfilment of  a second part within an adjacency pair is both 
a categorial and sequential phenomenon (Watson, 1997). Indeed, the reciprocity 
of  perspectives and Garfinkel’s (1967) notion of  trust (a necessary lubricant for 
all interaction as his breaching experiments illustrated) are orientations within 
which the moral-practical work of  categorization and sequential organization 
forms an important part.
Whilst the analysis of  members’ category work within and as part of  the flow 
of  interaction continues to prove a fruitful analytic approach, in this article, our 
attention turns to the way members orient towards a taken-for-granted, ‘internal’ 
logic of  categorization where, flowing from some initial categorization, further 
category/predicate work is seen to logically or normatively follow. In many 
respects, our discussion and analysis picks up from Sacks’ observation that ‘the 
mother picked her baby up because her baby was crying’ in that the action of  
the ‘mother’ is observably done in response to ‘her’ baby crying as that is what 
‘mothers (are expected to and expectedly seen to) do’. It is not then simply a matter 
of  one action following the other but that the actions as categories are morally 
ordered, such that if  her baby cries then she should then pick it up.1 In the discus-
sion below, we explore two forms of  what we term ‘categorization sequence’ work 
in relation to moral assessments, evaluation and accountability. In the first part 
of  the discussion, we examine the use of  ‘contrast devices’ before then examining 
the use and assembly of  a particular type of  ‘moral relational pairing’. In both 
cases, this will involve a consideration of  empirical examples.
Examples 1 and 2 below involve the deployment of  contrast devices and classes 
as a means of  providing morally contrastive resources that can be used to gener-
ate debate or position government agencies within well-documented tropes of  
untrustworthiness and ineptitude. They can be understood as categorization 
sequences in the sense that one device follows the other as a method for assem-
bling difference (e.g. fact–falsehood, right–wrong and us–them). In the second 
example, we consider how contrast devices can also be mobilized as a means of  
generating banal forms of  prejudice, underpinned by the invocation of  specific 
normative expectancies and group membership in relation to behaviour in public 
space.
The second form of  ‘categorization sequence’ that we explore (Example 3) 
is something we have elsewhere described as a ‘moral discrepancy device’ 
(Housley, 2002; Housley and Fitzgerald, 2003a, 2003b). Sacks noted how 
certain membership categories seemed to ‘go together’ in ‘standardized relational 
pairs’, for example ‘father–son’, ‘husband–wife’, ‘shopkeeper–customer’ and that 
actions associated with or observed through such category pairing involve a level 
of  routine ‘relationship’ predicates that serve to render accountable interaction 
between the category pair and the actions observed of  the category pair. Indeed, 
as suggested earlier, Sacks’ classic analysis of  the child’s story The Baby Cried. The 
Mommy Picked it Up (1974, 1995) contains a moral underpinning that we hear 
the mommy picking up the baby because it was crying, i.e. that there are moral 
predicates available in making sense of  the story where the mother should pick up 
 at UQ Library on February 6, 2012das.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Housley and Fitzgerald: Membership categorization, culture and norms in action 349
her baby if it is crying. Whilst the debate around how such relational pairings 
could be both occasioned matters but also a product of  commonsense knowl-
edge continues (Fitzgerald and Housley, 2002; Hester and Francis, 2000; 
McHoul et al., 2008), we turn our attention to examining how certain moral 
pairings or devices are utilized through personal or non-personal forms of  
categorization and/or predication (Hester and Eglin, 1997; Housley, 2000; 
Housley and Fitzgerald, 2002; McHoul and Watson, 1984). We approach these 
forms of  category pairs and associated predicates (i.e. moral relational devices) 
as relational in the sense that one may be expected to follow the next within 
accountable action as a moral-procedural requirement. The moral expectancies 
built in to relational devices configure the character of  what comes next: 
X then Y. Breaches between these relational devices, within occasioned settings, 
may generate interactional repair or the allocation of  moral uncertainty and 
judgement to certain ‘membership categories or devices of  agency’ implicated in 
any such breach. Relational pairings, then, have certain situated properties and 
moral logic that form a normative resource through which accountable action 
and description can be reflexively realized and regulated. In the next section of  
the article, we explore the two ‘categorization sequence’ devices in the context 
of  empirical materials gathered from different media settings where views and 
beliefs are displayed, debated and opined.
Categorization, contrast and normative action
REASON, REFUSAL AND MORALITY IN LETTERS TO THE EDITOR: TRANSPARENCY 
AND INVISIBILITY
Letters-to-the-editor are understood as a means through which citizens are able 
to air opinions within the public sphere and connect and add voice to current 
affairs within liberal democratic social forms (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2001). As a form 
of  communication, letters-to-the-editor often contain accounts within which dif-
ferent types of  categorization and predication are ascribed to agencies or persons 
within some sort of  temporal framing and sense-making ‘grammar’.
In terms of  the accounts displayed in the letter-to-the-editor that we discuss 
below, there is a discernible interplay between account, reason and experience/
perceptions. In this instance, the argument is formulated within the frame of  
devolution in Wales where a complex method of  ascribing moral and normative 
characteristics to a newly established democratic forum is evident (Housley and 
Wahl-Jorgensen, 2008). In one sense, the example constitutes a fragment and re-
source that represents and displays the distributed and situated accountable 
character of  the public sphere. It is a sphere within which members, institutions 
and organizations are practically occasioned through text and categorization.
Example One
1. When devolution was first ‘sold to us’ in 1997, we were assured that it would bring
2. ‘Welsh solutions to Welsh problems’ and allow us to at last take responsibility for
3. our own affairs.
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4. It therefore seems remarkable that the most significant aspect of  the current
5. Assembly has been the total refusal of  anyone at a ministerial level to take
6. responsibility for anything.
7. Transparency equals invisibility.
In this example, moral forms of  predication are ascribed to an object, namely the 
devolved Assembly in Wales and, more specifically, those who inhabit the higher 
levels of  Welsh Assembly government: in this case, refusal at ‘ministerial level’ 
to ‘take responsibility for anything’. This ‘refusal’ can be understood as a moral 
matter, as the refusal to take responsibility positions elected representatives as 
non-accountable in relation to the citizens of  Wales.
In constructing the argument, the letter makes use of  and displays forms of  
membership categorization and predication that can be tied to discourses of  gov-
ernment and governance. The letter initially provides a form of  attribution, 
‘responsibility’, to the citizens of  Wales, that ‘we’ would be responsible for ‘our’ own 
affairs. The ‘we’ is then used as a device within which ‘government’ and ‘voters’ 
are separated into categories and the predicate of  non-responsibility attributed 
to the category of  ‘government’. Here then, the predicate of  ‘responsibility’ is 
thus placed in a morally organized contrast pair through which the government 
has not taken ‘responsibility’, whilst previously promising to give responsibility 
for self-determination to the people of  Wales. From the contrast generated 
around the notion of  ‘responsibility’, and the notion that the government is not 
taking responsibility, a related predicate of  the government is then offered, that 
of  ‘transparency . . .’ paired with ‘. . . equals invisibility’. Through the device 
set up within the first part of  the letter, contrasting the notion of  responsibility 
and the lack of  it, the further predicate of  ‘transparency’ is heard as ironic 
when paired with ‘invisibility’. That is to say, the political-moral rhetoric of  pre-
dicated accountability mobilized through ‘responsibility for decisions taken’ and 
‘transparency’ in those decisions is turned into ironic predicates that in turn 
generate a form of  ludic ambiguity. Responsibility really means irresponsibility, 
as transparency really means invisibility.
The contrasts displayed in the account serve to apply a form of  moral categor-
ization work where the normative position of  the Welsh government is framed in 
terms of  established routine anxieties that are to be found in accounts concerning 
the citizen’s view of  government more generally. However, the contrast between 
responsibility and irresponsibility, transparency and invisibility also serve as re-
sources through which the generation of  debate amongst the newspaper reader-
ship can be placed and sustained. Moral contrasts are routinely selected and 
deployed as a means of  generating political debates in media settings (Housley, 
2002; Housley and Fitzgerald, 2003a, 2003b). This is necessary in order to 
achieve the clarity and ‘sense’ of  a public discourse object (in this case of  a ‘letter-
to-the-editor’ and having ‘your say’) and the editorial requirements and concern 
with ‘generating debate’ (Fitzgerald and Housley, 2002). In the example above, 
this can be seen to involve the moral and political characteristics of  the situated 
production of  the citizen’s moral reasoning that concern the wider flow of  events 
within the political landscape of  post-devolution Wales.
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Contrastive devices: people and acceptable behaviour
In the next example, taken from a radio phone-in programme, a caller creates a 
personal membership device that includes the host and other categories whilst 
excluding specified others, a situated production of  an ‘us and them’ contrast de-
vice which is organized around the evaluation of  public behaviour. In this sense, 
the caller proffers a form of  status degradation account (Garfinkel, 1956) that 
makes use of  the ‘us’ and ‘them’ device through which to classify the public 
behaviour of  some through a contrast membership of  heterosexuality and 
homosexuality: where the latter is tied to public behaviour that is seen as morally 
problematic.
Example Two
 1. Host:  why does (.) why does homosexuality appal you so so much
 2. Caller:  well think of  it use one’s imagination you know you
 3.  perhaps unwittingly go into a pub or bar and you find out
 4.  err to your err that that it is habited by these people
 5.  and they’re appalling to watch (.) I’m I’m not a great..you
 6.  know I’m not a member of  the Roman Catholic erh
 7.  following but I I do admire the Pope’s description of
 8.  homosexuality in that it is an abomination its absolutely
 9.  dreadful
10. Caller: [and when you start talking ]
11. Host: [but I’m I’m not quite sure wha ] what you see when you
12.  go into these pubs or clubs what it is you see that
13.  appalls you
14. Caller: their general act (.) it way [ you see ]
15. Host:   [showing ] affection for one
16.  another
17. Caller: urrh yes the way they carry on [I mean ]
18. Host:   [but what ] what do they
19.  carry on Ray.. [what’s what’s so upsetting]
20. Host:  [ but ] what is the sort of  thing you see Ray
21. Caller: well they act towards one [another, I mean it  ] absolutely
22. Host:  [how how do they act ]
23. Caller: appals me. You see them perhaps perhaps putting an arm
24.   around one another and kissing and things like that it it
25.  is really quite dreadful=
26. Host: =Ray Ray forgive me, why is somebody kissing somebody else
27.  dreadful isn’t that is[n’t that an expression of  ] love
28. Caller:  [there is nothing dreadful ] about
29.  it in its true sense of  the word (.) there is uh um and uhh
At line 5, the caller alludes to unacceptable behaviour that might be observed 
if  someone strayed inadvertently into a gay bar, ‘that they’re appalling to watch’. 
The ‘you’ at Line 2 can be heard as a weak inclusive device collecting together 
at least the caller and host. Whilst ‘you’ may include the host (and probably 
listeners), the ‘you’ does not, however, include ‘anyone’, as it presumably does not 
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include homosexuals as it is ‘their’ behaviour that is ‘appalling’. As Sacks (1995: 166) 
suggests:
[I]f  you use ‘you’, it at least includes the one you’re speaking to, and on the option 
or on your intention, insofar as those coincide, it can refer to anybody else, or to some 
category which includes everybody else.
With the construction of  ‘you know you perhaps unwittingly go into a pub or bar’
(l. 2, 3), the caller moves to include the host as having something in common 
with him. The description of  the public behaviour of  homosexuals as ‘appalling’, 
produced through the use of  ‘you know’, may on the one hand be seen to include 
an unstated predicated mutual knowledge of  ‘their’ behaviour (everyone knows 
what they do), but also a predicated negative evaluation of  such behaviour within 
the device ‘you and me’. Thus, the status of  a certain membership group perceived 
from within the device is negatively constituted without need of  explication as it 
is presented as ‘common sense’ to members of  the device. The use of  unstated 
knowledge assumed between members as a way of  indicating membership is 
discussed by Sacks (1995: 163) when he suggests:
[T]he routine use of  these things may operate to provide a great deal of  information 
for the one who uses them; for example, that on some occasion the other does in fact 
understand what one is talking about, by virtue of  the fact that he can continue to 
put in terms where, quote, nothing explicit has been said – or not much explicit has 
been said.
In this example, the caller uses an assumed category membership of  the host 
(heterosexuality) to create a device of  ‘us’ (caller and host) predicated with a similar 
attitude to homosexual activity, that it is ‘appalling to watch’ (l. 5). In one sense, 
this form of  categorization work provides an example of  a contrast device 
associated with the mundane mechanics of  prejudice; namely ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
where a discrepancy between ‘these people’ and ‘acceptable public behaviour’ 
is accounted for through a prejudicial account of  difference. This device is then 
elaborated and expanded upon through further category and predicate work. At 
line 5, the caller states that although he is not a member of  the Roman Catholic 
Church, he nonetheless admires the supposed teachings of  the Pope on this topic. 
This contrast class, then, is organized around an assumed normative and moral 
attitude whereby heterosexuals (us) and Catholics (now included with ‘us’) share 
a predicate in common, namely abhorrence of  homosexuality, i.e. it is the predicate 
that organizes category membership of  the device.
However, in this case, the host works to reject/deny membership of  this device 
(namely ‘us’) and thence the contrast class (‘us’ and ‘them’) and the move to gener-
ate morally predicated difference between specific categories of  members of  the 
general public and acceptable behaviour. By working to undermine the assumed 
tacit knowledge the caller alludes to, the host, as evidenced in the extracts below, 
claims ignorance not only of  the activities to which the caller implicitly refers 
but also of  the interpretation of  these activities.
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Transcript Examples
a. Host:  [but I’m I’m not quite sure what] what you see when you
  go into these pubs or clubs what it is you see that appals you
  . . .
b. Host: [showing ] affection for one another
  . . .
c. Host: [but what] what do they carry on Ray.. [what’s what’s so upsetting]
  . . .
d. Host: [but] what is the sort of  thing you see Ray
  . . . 
e. Host: [how how do they act ]
  . . .
f. Host: = Ray Ray forgive me, why is somebody kissing
  somebody else dreadful isn’t
  that is[n’t that an expression of] love
That is, the host can be seen to ‘play dumb’ (Sacks, 1995: 163) as a way of  avoid-
ing inclusion in the contrastive device. This can be understood as a strategy 
for reducing the generation of  predicates that might recognizably infer moral 
censure towards a certain group of  people’s behaviour in public space.
What is analytically interesting in these examples is the way the device 
‘people’ and the predicates of  ‘acceptable behaviour in public’ are reformulated 
and transformed through further membership categorization work that involves 
mapping the category-bound attitudes/predicates onto a specific identity group 
category’s behaviour as part and parcel of  an ‘us’ and ‘them’ formulation. In other 
words, the predicate work invokes variations of  predicate display as a situated 
frame for categorical sense making and the invocation of  an unstated but avail-
able normative inference. Furthermore, in this instance, heterosexuals and Catholics 
are conflated through a form of  moral predication where anti-homosexual senti-
ments are presented as a position associated with both population categories.
To challenge the caller’s normative and moral predicates, the host plays 
dumb about ‘what everyone knows’ as a way of  attempting to avoid inclusion in 
the device by making problematic the assumed as ‘known in common’ predic-
ates of  the categories within the device. By continually questioning the caller on 
the predicates assumed by the invoked category heterosexual, the host actively 
resists inclusion in the device. To be a member of  this particular device as it is 
being produced here would assume common knowledge of, and acceptance of, the 
predicates the caller is using to accomplish banal homophobia and the negative 
moral assessment of  a particular social group.
Thus, in terms of  our preceding analysis in relation to morality and cat-
egorization, some of  the properties of  contrast devices can be said to include the 
following:
1. They form a contrastive resource that can be used to formulate next-turn 
activities such as generating debate or morally positioning objects or persons 
on particular sides of  the category bifurcation (e.g. ‘them’ and ‘us’).
 at UQ Library on February 6, 2012das.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
354 Discourse & Society 20(3)
2. They occur within, are embedded within and are a consequential part of  
sequential organization.
3. They provide a praxiological resource for generating difference as an accom-
plished normative inference and resource which can then be used to make 
further characterizations of  persons, groups or collectivities.
4. They generate accountability in terms of  binary normative contrast that 
reduces the complexity of  witnessable or reported activity, events, occurrences 
or claims.
5. They provide the categorical means through which the degradation of  status 
and the transformation of  total identities to downgraded positions of  identity 
are mobilized in stories and accounts where degradation matters are being 
attended to.
Moral relational pairings and normative action
As indicated in previous studies, talk is suffused with descriptions and forms of  
categorization and categorically ordered accounts that are moral in character 
(Housley and Fitzgerald, 2002; Jayyusi, 1984, 1991). The terrain of  political 
discourse within media settings is certainly no exception. The use of  categories 
and forms of  categorization form part of  the mundane methods used to generate 
debate, represent public views and feelings and bring elected representatives 
and decision-makers to account. As we have demonstrated in previous work 
(Fitzgerald and Housley, 2002, 2006; Housley, 2002; Housley and Fitzgerald, 
2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2007,), this accounting work within the interactional 
machinery of  interviews makes use of  specific moral devices. These devices are 
configured in terms of  a procedural–relational pairing outlined earlier in this 
article, in the sense that two categories are not only normatively tied, but also 
that one follows the other; examples of  such moral devices often used within 
political interviews include ‘blameworthiness → punishment’ and ‘intention-
avowal → action’. These devices are common features of  much political discourse 
in which senses of  accountability are being pursued; they can be understood 
as readily available, widely understood and sanctioned normative principles. 
As such, they are resources through which actions can be made normatively 
accountable. Thus, in the context of  political news interviews, they are used as 
cultural resources for generating senses of  ‘public’ accountability. This takes the 
form of  introducing such devices as necessarily relevant and applicable moral 
concerns and attempting to characterize members of  decision-making col-
lectivities (e.g. the government or a political party) as those whose actions are pre-
dicated upon a discrepancy between the categories of  such moral device-based 
pairings. A discrepancy between such pairings (i.e. that in a specific case or set 
of  cases, one part of  the pairing has not or is not following the other) constitutes 
a normative breach. The display or occasioned production of  such a breach can 
invoke interactional and moral repair; repair and its orienting sensibilities is the 
font from which accountability flows.
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In the case of  the normative pairing of  ‘intention-avowal → action’, we can 
see how in the case of  political manifesto commitments, an apparent discrepancy 
between such policy intentions and government actions over a period of  elected 
office could potentially constitute such a normative breach, although the rout-
ine display or attribution of  such breaches could give rise to an account where 
unfulfilled election promises suggest there was never any ‘real’ intention to 
carry out the promises. Indeed, this separation of  ‘intention-avowal’ and ‘action’ 
within the context of  election promises and government actions has given rise 
to the remedial notions of  ‘core’ and ‘non-core’ election promises in Australia, 
which serve to maintain the original intention of  the promise yet allow ‘circum-
stances’ to intervene to thwart the fulfilment of  the election promise when in 
government. These ‘breaches’ can be used as normatively generated features 
for further accountability work in political interviews and similar settings as 
a means of  attempting to ascribe further relevant categories to such breaches, 
e.g. untrustworthiness, incompetence or lack of  political skill. Therefore, a suc-
cessful ascription of  such a moral discrepancy to a collective or an individual 
member of  that collective, for example a government or minister, is to be 
(interactively) avoided. An ascription of  moral discrepancy to such collectives 
may be normatively damaging and, once invoked, provides further discursive 
resources through which such collectives may be questioned, disbelieved or 
undermined. Consequently, within the context of  political discourse in general, 
and news interviews in particular, methods are employed in order to avoid such 
descriptions. These methods may take the form of  simple answer management 
or rhetorical and practical means through which such lines of  questioning and 
forms of  moral predication are fudged or resisted (Clayman and Heritage, 2002; 
Housley, 2002). However, in addition to the specific moral discrepancy device 
(i.e. intention-avowal → action) discussed above and explored in previous work 
(Housley, 2002; Housley and Fitzgerald, 2003b), further moral discrepancy 
devices can be observed in accountability work within political news media 
sites and settings. Of  particular interest here is the moral discrepancy device 
blame-worthiness → punishment. In the following example, we explore the use 
of  this device in a political news interview, both in terms of  accountability work 
and the management of  the topic by the interviewer and guest. The materials 
examined here concern the BSE2 enquiry and the Phillips report in the UK as 
displayed within a broadcast political interview. The Phillips report had suggested 
that individual blame was not appropriate in the case of  the BSE crisis, whilst a 
culture of  secrecy had provided a source of  problems in dealing with the crisis 
at an organizational level.
The following extracts are gathered from the programme ‘On the Record’, a 
TV news and current affairs programme broadcast by the BBC on 11 February 
2001. In the following extract, the interviewer begins to question the guest on 
the public enquiry into the BSE crisis in the UK. The interviewer suggests that the 
government will be using the previous government’s handling of  the BSE crisis 
as an electoral resource during the upcoming election campaign.
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Example Three
 1. I: You’re going to be using, as I understand it (.) the BSE crisis and the way
 2.  the Tories handled it (.) to attack them during the election campaign when
 3.  it arrives, but you have a problem here don’t you, because you don’t
 4.  seem to think anybody is to blame (.) that is to say, nobody is being
 5.  punished for it, therefore we can assume can we not, that nobody is to
 6.  blame (.) Why isn’t anybody being punished? It’s a question an awful lot of
 7.  people want answered.
 8. G: Look (.) firstly I think the electorate made their mind up on the
 1.  Conservatives’ handling of  the BSE tragedy at the last general election,
 2.  The nineteen-ninety-seven general election. The whole purpose of  the
 3.  government’s interim response to Phillips is to look forward, not to look
 4.  backwards, and to make sure we put arrangements in place so that
 5.  something like this never happens again, or at least we’ve taken every
 6.  step we possibly can to avoid it.
14. I: But I think if  I were a farmer whose livelihood had been destroyed (.) or
15.  even more (.) much more (.) if  I were the parent of  a child who had died (.) I
16.  would say fine (.) that’s a perfectly good politician’s answer (.) but I want
17.  somebody’s neck on the block for this (.) I want somebody to be punished
18.  for it (.) it’s a completely human response isn’t it?
The interviewer notes that the potential (suggested) strategy presents a problem 
for the government in the context of  the recent findings of  the BSE enquiry and 
the government response to it. The interviewer suggests that in fact the response 
represents a ‘problem’ (l. 3) – namely, that the response does not constitute a 
clear allocation of  blame. This is qualified through the elicitation of  a form of  
predication tied to the category of  ‘blame-worthiness’ (l. 3–4). The categories of  
blame-worthiness and punishment can be understood to form a moral device 
which can be heard to constitute a relational and procedural normative pairing, 
between the category of  moral accountability found in blame-worthiness and 
the expected next activity of  punishment. This moral sequence of  categorization 
is reiterated through the way in which the interviewer affirms the moral device 
that is being introduced in the opening account; ‘nobody is being punished for 
it, therefore we can assume can we not, that nobody is to blame’, that nobody is tak-
ing responsibility for the problem (l. 4–5). The suggestion is then closed with an 
affirmation of  the second part of  the pairing (l. 6), ‘Why isn’t anybody being pun-
ished’. The introduction of  the moral device is characterized by an elicitation of  
the first (l. 4). The interviewer asks why no one is being blamed, why nobody is 
being thought to be responsible, highlighting the issue that there is no procedure 
for allocating responsibility, located in the fact that no one is being punished. He 
continues by characterizing such a question as one that is of  interest to a ‘lot 
of  people’ (l. 6–7). As this commentary suggests, the introduction of  the moral 
device is organized in a specific way. It begins with the first part of  the moral 
equation, namely blame-worthiness, relates the second half  of  the equation in 
terms of  a relational and procedural pair (blame-worthiness and punishment) 
and ends with a question that affirms and displays the second half  of  the moral 
equation, namely why no one in government is being punished for the BSE crisis. 
It is in this way that the moral device of  blame-worthiness → punishment, 
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within the context of  the BSE debate, is introduced by the interviewer within 
the question/answer format of  the political interview. Furthermore, the closing 
question provides the ground for establishing a procedure for ascribing a 
discrepancy between blame and punishment within the context of  the BSE crisis. 
In this case, a possible discrepancy being ascribed to government, i.e. between 
the allocation of  blame not resulting in some form of  punishment, is one that 
can be used as a resource for generating potentially damaging characterizations 
of  the government to which the guest belongs. However, in this instance, whilst 
the option for dealing with such moral device-oriented questioning remains a 
possible strategy, the option of  not even recognizing the device remains a pos-
sibility for the guest. This is a morally dangerous strategy, as non-recognition of  
the moral principle can provide a further resource for the interviewer in pursuit 
of  the generation of  accountable responses or characterizing government policy 
and action in an unfavourable manner (Housley, 2002).
The guest’s response exhibits a standard method for dealing with questions 
that generate potential spaces within which moral discrepancy or a moral 
vacuum may be ascribed to the collective that the guest represents. In terms of  
‘answer management’, the guest utilizes some methods associated with providing 
a fudged response to morally searching question formats. The guest does respond 
to the category-bound topic of  ‘people’ by pointing toward the ‘electorate’ that 
can be understood to be a relevant co-category of  the device ‘population’. However, 
the issue of  the allocation of  blame and punishment is not referred to. The guest 
refers to the previous government’s handling of  the BSE crisis, reflected, it is sug-
gested, by the election result in 1997. This is then followed by a description of  the 
government’s ‘interim’ response to the Phillips report which is characterized as 
looking forward, holding a concern ‘not to look backwards’ (l. 11–12) and ensuring 
that policies or ‘arrangements’ are put in place in order that ‘something like this 
never happens again’ (l. 13). This category display represents a form of  fudged 
response that utilizes topical complexity as a means of  responding to the moral 
device introduced by the interviewer in the account/question format. As stated 
previously (Housley, 2002: 17), topical complexity can be understood as a:
. . . manoeuvre [that] facilitates multiple local rationalities, hearings and histories of  
the exchange. After all, it is a design feature of  such [broadcast] settings and talk that 
it is recorded and segments may be replayed and discussed and different claims about 
what has been meant voiced within different news contexts.
Whilst topical complexity may be used to generate topical coherence in political 
news interviews, such topical complexity serves to generate incoherence by pro-
viding the materials for fudging the response in terms of  a number of  alternate 
category connections that are not directly (although they may represent pre-
ferred topics for those being questioned or providing answers in political news 
interviews) related to the question – in this case, questions concerning the alloc-
ation of  blame and punishment.
The interviewer responds to this fudged response to the question and moral 
device that is, from the interviewer’s perspective and category display, being 
pursued. The response takes the form of  two condensed stories that ground the 
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moral configuration of  blame-worthiness → punishment in terms of  specific 
membership categories – namely, a farmer whose livelihood had been destroyed 
(l. 15) and a parent ‘of  a child who had died’ (l. 16). The interviewer suggests 
that members of  the same categories would be inclined to allocate blame and 
deliver punishment (l. 18), i.e. they would be oriented to the moral device set up, 
described and initiated at the beginning of  the interview which the guest has, so 
far, not recognized or chosen to refer to. The device, in this instance, is expressed 
in terms of  wanting ‘somebody’s neck on the block for this’. The account is, again, 
closed with a question, namely that orientation to the moral device of  blame-
worthiness → punishment is a ‘human response’. The duplicative organization of  
categorization and devices (Watson, 1997) enables a framing of  the moral device 
blame-worthiness → punishment within the context of  the BSE crisis as one that 
is both personally realized and topically relevant (the ‘farmer’, the ‘parent’) and 
universally recognizable and understandable (‘human response’). This pitches 
the device not merely as one that is locally specific or particular but as one that 
is also universal or ‘normative’. This is, in one sense, a reversal of  synecdoche, 
in which particular circumstances (as represented in the condensed stories of  
the farmer and the parent) are mapped on to normative categories – in this case, 
typical human responses. Finally, in terms of  this analytic discussion, we argue 
that moral relational devices can be understood to display certain properties that 
can be summarized as follows:
1. They form a normative pairing that make praxiological sense within a given 
cultural field or form of  life.
2. They occur, are embedded within and are a consequential part of  sequential 
organization.
3. They are produced as a product of  situated action and categorization work.
4. They are used to generate accountability on behalf  of  actors, agencies or 
institutions or indeed particular versions of  events or ‘social reality’. As such, 
they form a categorical resource through which motive, as vocabulary, is 
ascribed.
5. They are recognizable signatures of  norms-in-action. As normative particles, 
they are central to our understanding of  ‘ontological politics’.
6. They have a temporal-moral relation so that one is expected to follow the 
other.
7. As normative pairings, they bifurcate the possibility of  polymorphous versions 
of  events and therefore reduce complexity.
8. Their display is recognizable and therefore open to observational and 
empirical scrutiny as a dimension of  members’ practical methods.
Conclusion
In this article, we have attempted to examine how specific forms of  categorization 
work are utilized in various forms of  accountable interaction and published texts – 
in this case, a letter-to-the-editor of  a national newspaper, a public access phone-
in and a broadcast political interview. We note that these practices constitute 
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forms of  action that generate and position groups, agencies, institutions and 
individuals in relation to types of  accountable world views. In doing so, they 
accomplish not only a discursive ordering but also establish various situated 
moral logics that underpin the constitution of  social relations (Latimer, 2004). 
The examination of  situated categorization work and the analysis of  specific 
moral-relational pairings and contrastive devices provide a means of  exploring 
normative regulation as situated practice. The analysis of  such ‘regulative 
practice’ as a situated activity within the mediated public sphere (Fitzgerald 
and Housley, 2007; Housley and Fitzgerald, 2007), and within other settings, 
is central to an understanding of  how contemporary ‘cultural politics’ is played 
out in practice in public domains. Indeed, Membership Categorization Analysis 
may offer an analytical method for describing and understanding the mundane 
mechanics of  the politics of  recognition (Smith and Tatalovich, 2003: 30) in 
future avenues of  analysis and research. MCA serves to reveal the ways in which 
populations and constituent identity groups are categorized, morally constituted 
and accounted for in practice which in turn can inform questions about the 
sociological understanding of  normative regulation and norms-in-action in 
relation to the current state of  cultural and morality politics where questions of  
‘recognition’ have become paramount. In doing so, MCA (as a component of  EM) 
may provide an analytic frame with which to explore cultural politics and its 
close cousin identity politics as mundane but ubiquitous interactional matters. In 
this sense, the various ceremonies of  truth and ‘fact finding’ that pervade social, 
political and democratic practices (Lynch and Bogen, 1996) can be explicated in 
terms of  practical moral reasoning and categorical regulation of  membership, 
i.e. who belongs where, and when and how they should or should not act. It is 
these practices that constitute norms-in-action.
The contribution of  such an approach is a programme of  research that 
unravels the precise processes and contextual arrangements associated with 
mundane civility, prejudice, communicative rationality, understanding and moral 
conflict that suffuse the mediated (and non-mediated) public sphere. In this way, 
the analysis presented in this article serves to demonstrate how the normative 
character of  certain category formulations has a strong association with onto-
logical politics and how the mundane reproduction of  contested culture(s) and 
politics is a situated social organizational practice.
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N O T E S
1. See also Kitzinger’s (2008) discussion of  the ‘if/then’ sequence (as part of  her 
response to Wowk’s critique) in her identification and analysis of  ‘heteronormativity’ 
as a social norm. Whilst acknowledging the sequential organization of  ‘if/then’ 
as a way of  exploring social norms, however, she neglects the possible categorial 
 at UQ Library on February 6, 2012das.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
360 Discourse & Society 20(3)
organization which, we argue here, provides a valuable component to the analysis 
of  norms-in-action.
2. The findings of  the public enquiry into the UK government handling of  the BSE 
(also known as ‘mad cow disease’ which was passed to cattle through tainted feedstock 
and humans through infected meat products) crisis was published in the form of  
the Phillips report. The report was widely understood to avoid issues of  individual 
blame and suggested that a ‘culture of  secrecy’ and the structures of  government 
were the principle sources of  problems in relation to the management and handling 
of  the crisis.
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A P P E N D I X
Transcript notation
I = interviewer 
Host/Caller = as in transcript
G = guest
The following conventions, developed by Gail Jefferson, were used for my transcripts. These 
conventions denote lapses in time, overlapping talk, pace and, in some instances, pitch, 
pronunciation and stress. I have only included those symbols used in my transcriptions.
Numbers in parentheses: e.g. (1.0) denotes the approximate duration pauses or gaps 
between utterances in seconds or tenths of  seconds
Point in parentheses: (.) indicates a ‘micro-pause’ of  less than two tenths of  a second
Letters, words or activities in parentheses: (cough) sounds, words or activities that 
are distinct or difficult to locate to a particular interlocutor(s)
Square brackets: [ ] mark the points where talk overlaps
Full colons: (::) denote an extension in the vowel or consonant sound in the utterance 
of  a word
Emphasis: (CAPITALS) indicates specific emphasis and change in volume
Underlined word: (as we said) indicates pitch change
Equals sign: = identifies a ‘latching’ between utterances, whereby utterances follow 
each other rapidly after a preceding utterance.
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